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Varun K. Menon
 As the leaves began to reach their boldest reds, oranges, 
and yellows across the Potomac River Valley in early November 
1811, Henry Clay and his family finally arrived in the nation’s 
capital after a seemingly endless journey along the rugged roads 
from their Kentucky home. His wife, Lucretia, had insisted 
that their six children accompany her if  she were to sustain the 
long trip to Washington D.C. Ever the “Great Compromiser,” a 
reputation he was destined to earn over a long career ahead of  
him in the United States (U.S.) Congress, Clay acquiesced to her 
demands in order to gain the desired outcome: he wanted his wife 
to be at his side for the beginning of  this next exciting chapter 
in his life.1 The 34-year-old Kentucky Republican had come to 
Washington D.C. to begin his third stint in Congress, having been 
previously appointed by the Kentucky Legislature two times to 
temporarily replace outgoing senators. This time, Clay returned to 
the capital for his first full congressional term in the U.S. House 
of  Representatives after his election by the voters of  Kentucky’s 
5th district.2
Washington City, as it was called in those days, was a far 
cry from the magnificent marble capital it would later become. 
Built in the middle of  a swamp off  the Potomac River on land 
ceded from Maryland and Virginia to create the permanent federal 
District of  Columbia, the settlement possessed hardly any of  the 
trappings that might lead one to even call it a city, much less the 
capital of  an independent country. In fact, it paled in comparison 
to even its neighboring towns in the District, Georgetown and 
Alexandria. European ministers representing their home nations 
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Representative Henry Clay (DR-KY) transformed the 
office of Speaker of the House into a position of un-
precedented political power in the Federal Government
in the American capital considered it a “hardship post,” as far 
removed from what they considered the civilized world as pos-
sibly imaginable. Members of  Congress would have strongly 
agreed. The landscape of  the city was marked by disorganized 
clusters of  disparate wooden houses and storefronts that dotted 
muddy lanes.3 Senators and representatives lodged in one of  the 
few ramshackle boarding houses populating the city during the 
sessions, which usually ran from December to April or to May 
of  the next year, depending on how much business had to be 
addressed. Given the wretched conditions of  the nation’s capi-
tal, the legislators left town in a hurry as soon as Congress ad-
journed,  leaving  the  city  with  hardly  any  residents.  Since  the 
livelihood of  the city was almost entirely dependent on govern-
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ment, business essentially halted after adjournment.4
At the top of  Jenkins Hill, what we call Capitol Hill 
today, was perched a beautiful white marble building designed 
by Dr. William Thornton, with two wings on either side that 
held the respective chambers of  the Senate and the House of  
Representatives.5 The gleaming United States Capitol and the 
President’s House (the White House) stood in stark contrast to 
their bleak surroundings, but nonetheless were the first symbols 
of  a burgeoning capital city and a rapidly ascendant American 
Republic. Outside of  deliberative sessions held at the United 
States Capitol, members would normally conduct most of  their 
personal business at their rented rooms at the boarding houses. 
There they wrote and read correspondence, received constituents, 
and parleyed with other congressmen. Clay and his family took 
up residence for the session at Mrs. Dowson’s boarding house, 
down one of  the unpaved alleys leading up to Capitol Hill.6
Even before arriving in Washington City, Clay was 
devising his next move regarding what had become the 
paramount political issue of  the day: the prospect of  war against 
Great Britain. Since his last time in the capital, he had become 
the leading voice for a faction that believed the United States 
faced a crisis of  national honor in the face of  continued British 
aggression. The present tensions had begun when the U.S. 
professed neutrality in the Napoleonic Wars that were consuming 
the European continent and much of  the Atlantic World. Neither 
Britain nor France seemed to respect this position, instead opting 
to seize private American vessels attempting to trade in the ports 
of  the enemy. At the recommendation of  President Thomas 
Jefferson, Congress enacted an embargo on all goods imported 
or exported overseas in order to pressure Britain and France to 
respect American neutrality.
This policy backfired, proving disastrous to the young 
republic’s economic health while extracting no concessions from 
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either power.7 Despite several instances of  French violations, 
it was the former motherland’s especially bold offenses against 
U.S. sovereignty that pricked the American conscience most. 
Repeated instances of  naval seizures on the high seas and 
ongoing military aid to agitated Native American tribes on the 
western frontier reinforced Clay’s publicly-stated conclusion that 
the young republic had no other choice but to fight a second 
war of  independence. “Is the time never to arrive when we may 
manage our own affairs without the fear of  insulting his Britannic 
Majesty?” Clay had implored his colleagues in the Senate a year 
earlier, “Is the rod of  British power to be forever suspended over 
our heads?”8
With animated orations such as that, Clay carved out 
a reputation across the country as the impassioned firebrand 
for the movement to defend the nation’s integrity through war 
with Great Britain. “The Western Star,” as he was being called, 
was not alone in this quest. In fact, the 34-year-old Kentuckian 
formed the vanguard of  a rising coalition of  Republicans 
derisively labeled by their enemies as the “War Hawks.” These 
younger members from the southern and western regions mainly 
sat in the House, and prominently included John C. Calhoun 
(DR-SC), Langdon Cheves (DR-SC), William Lowndes (DR-
SC), Felix Grundy (DR-TN), and William Wyatt Bibb (DR-GA). 
They agitated for armed conflict with Great Britain in retaliation 
for the offenses they believed that nation had committed against 
U.S. sovereignty. There was also a controversial claim that the 
War Hawks meant to expand the nation territorially through 
war, especially by invading and annexing British Canada. The 
War Hawks surprised the Republican Party establishment by 
organizing quickly following their election and by coalescing 
around a central legislative strategy to lead the nation into 
war.9 On the eve of  the first session of  the 12th United States 
Congress, the young War Mess, as the core Hawks were known, 
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met for dinner at Mrs. Dowson’s boarding house to discuss their 
strategy for the next day and the coming months.10 Little did 
they know that they were on the verge of  ushering in a new 
age in American politics and foreign affairs, one that would see 
the Congress come to exercise unprecedented influence over the 
foreign relations of  the United States.
THE TRAILBLAZING TWELFTH CONGRESS
In the rapidly ascendant American Republic of  the early 
nineteenth century, the 12th United States Congress (elected to sit 
from 1811 to 1813) heralded a new era of  legislative assertiveness 
in national politics and particularly in foreign affairs. There were 
many accompanying trends both domestically and internationally 
that would facilitate the emergence of  Congress as an independent 
pole from the executive branch in the foreign policy-making 
process during the next eighteen years. First, the 12th Congress 
constituted one of  the youngest groups of  lawmakers in 
American history to take control of  the legislative branch. Public 
discontent with the inept gridlock of  the previous Congress had 
caused angry constituents to clean the House and the Senate of  
its many seasoned incumbents in favor of  young challengers who 
promised decisive action. The result was perhaps the greatest 
electoral purge in American political history: with 62 freshmen, 
44 percent of  the entire House membership in the 12th Congress 
was new amid some states replacing their entire delegations.11 
Following this slaughter at the ballot box, the majority of  new 
members in the House were under the age of  forty, including 
the 34-year-old Clay.12 These young representatives accurately 
represented a young nation whose average national age was only 
sixteen years old.13 This unprecedented youth and inexperience 
in Congress, coupled with a clear voters’ mandate for legislative 
action to confront the ongoing international conflict, no doubt 
had an effect in reforming modes of  thinking about how the 
legislative branch should engage in international affairs and 
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American statecraft.
The significance of  this shift is reinforced by examining 
the career trajectories and legacies of  the freshmen entering 
Congress between 1811 and 1815. The two momentous sittings 
of  the legislative branch that witnessed the full declaration and 
prosecution of  the War of  1812, as well as the 12th and 13th 
Congresses (the “War Congresses”), would give birth to the 
careers of  some of  the finest statesmen in American history. 
A prominent sketch and series of  biographies from Congress 
written in 1850 names the men who were viewed as the most 
important legislators of  that time. In addition to Clay and 
Calhoun, there was Daniel Webster (F-NH), John Forsyth (DR-
GA), Nathaniel Macon (DR-NC), William Gaston (F-NC), 
Thomas Pickering (F-MA), John W. Taylor (DR-NY), Charles J. 
Ingersoll (DR-PA), and William Rufus King (DR-AL).14 All were 
members of  the House and, with the exception of  the veterans 
Pickering and Macon, were freshmen in either the 12th or 13th 
Congress. As the 1850 biographer would later observe of  these 
prominent lawmakers, “most of  them [were] just starting, with 
generous rivalry, upon their race of  distinction.”15 Simply put, the 
young men that were entering the federal legislature during the 
12th and 13th Congresses amid the buzz of  war were to reshape 
the landscape of  American politics in the next half  century. It is 
interesting to note for our purposes that of  the eight freshmen 
mentioned, five received their start on committees of  foreign 
affairs or gained early prominence in foreign policymaking.16 
The assertive transformation in legislative thinking 
symbolized by the entrance of  an emboldened generation of  
young lawmakers was also augmented by a second ongoing trend 
in the country: the meteoric expansion of  the nation and the 
resulting legislative apportionments in the West. As the nation’s 
population had roughly doubled in the approximately twenty 
years since the Constitution’s ratification in 1788, the House 
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in particular was growing at a rapid pace. Between the census 
years of  1800 and 1810, the national population soared from 
5.3 million to 7.2 million, while the geographic land area of  the 
country expanded by 865,000 square miles to 1,682,000 square 
miles.17 As a result of  the nation’s exponential growth, the House 
ballooned from 65 seats at its inception in 1789 to 181 seats for 
the 13th Congress in 1813.18 This proliferation would have major 
implications for the structure, operation, and temperament of  
the House: with each admitted state and newly-created seat, it 
was increasingly untenable for the body to function in its original 
form as a collegial assembly that lacked deliberation restrictions 
and a hierarchical leadership order. 
These constraints most assuredly caused the House 
to reshape itself  during this period, a process which would 
accelerate during the 12th and 13th Congresses with the War of  
1812. The reformed House of  Representatives would emerge 
from the metamorphosis with more responsive, polished, and 
effective mechanisms that would facilitate its freshmen members’ 
legislative assertiveness in foreign policymaking and international 
statecraft in the coming years. Additionally, it is significant to note 
that population gains (and thus, legislative apportionment gains) 
were coming largely from the recently admitted western states. 
The interests for war with Great Britain among this region’s 
electorate were intimate and clearly delineated: the British were 
suspected to be actively aiding and abetting Native American 
tribes led by Shawnee Chief  Tecumseh’s confederation in their 
repulsions of  white settlers. Each defeat on the frontier was a 
smarting reminder of  the former motherland’s continued hand 
on the continent.19 Given these circumstances, it is no wonder 
that the young War Hawks faction mobilized so quickly and 
gained a position of  preeminence in the House within one 
election cycle.
The third trend was the breakdown of  the original two-
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party system, at least in terms of  congressional caucuses, which 
was beginning to run its course as early as the 10th Congress 
(1807-1809).20 With the Federalists now nationally irrelevant and 
fading into the sunset of  American history, Thomas Jefferson’s 
dominant Republican Party (the Democratic-Republicans) was 
already splintering into four discernable factions within Congress: 
the Clintonians, disciples of  the aging Vice President George 
Clinton (DR-NY), who harvested votes in New England and 
New York from the flagging Federalists by advocating commercial 
and shipping interests; the Tertium Quids (or simply, Quids), 
“old school” Jeffersonian Republicans who adhered to the strict 
constitutionalism and limited federal government approach of  
their clarion Representative John Randolph of  Roanoke (DR-
VA) and tied their long-term electoral hopes to the potential 
political resurgence of  James Monroe of  Virginia; the Invisibles, 
a peculiar faction largely relegated to the Senate that faithfully 
rallied to the banner of  Senator Samuel Smith (DR-MD) in his 
personal and political crusade against Secretary of  the Treasury 
Albert Gallatin; and finally, a faction of  Republicans who 
remained loyal to the Jefferson Administration and still looked 
to the White House for leadership.21 Nothing better exemplified 
the collapse in the Republican Party’s unity than the boycott of  
some sixty Clintonians (who supported James Monroe) from 
the party’s presidential caucus that nominated Secretary of  State 
James Madison of  Virginia for the 1808 ticket instead.22
These fissures were exacerbated by Jefferson’s increasing 
resignation from national politics as his departure from the 
Presidency grew imminent; during the course of  the 10th Congress, 
he had failed to exercise the leadership and discipline necessary 
to maintain his party’s unity for his successor. Considering that 
neither party had instituted proper partisan leadership structures 
in the legislative branch, the result was a total collapse in party 
cohesion.23 For reasons that will be explored next, President 
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James Madison was powerless to prevent the full fracturing of  the 
Republican caucus in the 11th Congress (1809-1811). So while the 
United States’ two parties remained nominally the Federalists and 
the Republicans, the latter’s commanding majorities in the House 
and the Senate no longer translated into legislative decisiveness. 
The sum outcome of  these circumstances was a power vacuum 
in both chambers that at worst threatened to render Congress, 
and the republican form of  government, irrelevant; but at best, 
it provided the perfect conditions for a new, fervent faction of  
lawmakers to seize command of  the entire body and impose 
their will on the nation with the full constitutional arsenal of  
legislative powers ascribed to the federal legislature.
A fourth unavoidable contribution to an environment 
conducive to legislative assertiveness in foreign affairs was the 
man who occupied the White House when the 12th Congress 
took office in late 1811. James Madison, the “Father of  the 
Constitution” and the first President to have served in a 
post-Constitution Congress, was considered the preeminent 
champion of  legislative supremacy among the Founding Fathers. 
“In republican government, the legislative authority necessarily 
predominates,” Madison had stipulated without qualification in 
The Federalist No. 51, a viewpoint that he more or less maintained 
throughout his entire tenure of  public service.24 In general, the 
Virginian believed that the executive should submit to the will 
of  the national legislature for democratic governance to be truly 
successful. Perhaps because of  this principled commitment to 
legislative government, Madison proved to be different from his 
three presidential predecessors.
Previous executive administrations had featured forceful 
and occasionally overbearing leadership that significantly 
influenced the mechanics of  Congress. President George 
Washington, “Father of  the Nation” as he was, commanded a 
peerless respect over the government with a cabinet of  legendary 
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American Revolution Era figures that included the two major 
partisan poles of  the time: Alexander Hamilton and Thomas 
Jefferson. Despite or probably because of  his refusal to seize 
power for himself  in the wake of  the American Revolutionary 
War (1775-1783), Washington was a particularly powerful 
executive whom the American public and its representatives 
held in the highest regard. His successor, John Adams, was 
survived by a mixed legacy of  enhancing federal power through 
unbridled executive authority during the Quasi-War (1789-1800). 
And Thomas Jefferson, father of  the Republican Party (the 
Democratic-Republican Party as it is called today) and ostensible 
champion of  limited federal and executive authority, exercised 
enormous influence in Congress with overwhelming majorities in 
both chambers keen to prove their loyalty to him with their every 
action. The first two decades of  the American Republic had thus 
witnessed the powerful force of  partisan politics emerge from 
leadership within the executive branch.
But in contrast to his strong-armed predecessors, 
President Madison seemed to depart in varying degrees from 
the first three administrations’ reliance on executive authority 
and on more assertive leadership in both foreign and domestic 
affairs. Madison’s republican ideology and insistence that the 
bulk of  national decision-making remain with and in Congress 
seemed to preclude him from attempting to dominate or to 
coerce the legislative body in the ways that his predecessors 
had.25 Unlike Jefferson, Madison was neither willing nor capable 
of  wielding the presidential influence (especially in terms of  
partisan leadership in the Democratic-Republican caucus) that 
his preponderate forerunner had mastered to gain his desired 
outcomes in legislative action. Furthermore, and unlike his three 
predecessors, Madison’s election by a congressional caucus would 
ensure that his political leash originated in the legislative branch. 
Unlike Jefferson, who raised his congressional colleagues to their 
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positions, Madison owed his own position to his congressional 
colleagues.26 In the words of  Professor Marshall Smelser, “As 
the creation of  the caucus, Madison could never dominate his 
makers.”27 As one shall see, this fact in particular would have 
major ramifications in the charge for war in 1812. In summary, 
while the party collapsed internally amid the factional crisis 
in Congress, help seemed unlikely and unable to come from 
Madison’s White House.
An early sign that Madison was not prepared to confront 
Congress, especially in foreign policy, came when he nominated 
his former Jefferson Cabinet colleague Albert Gallatin as 
his first Secretary of  State in 1809. Instead of  employing his 
recent electoral mandate and unquestioned leadership of  the 
Democratic-Republican Party to squash what appears to have 
been a petty personal fight over patronage as his predecessor 
likely would have done, Madison allowed the Senate to reject his 
appointee with no noticeable backlash.28 Led by the Invisibles 
faction of  Republicans, the Senate then proceeded to impose 
their will upon Madison by pressuring him to appoint their 
candidate of  choice, Robert Smith, the brother of  Senator Samuel 
Smith (DR-MD). The Senate undoubtedly knew that Smith was 
opposed to many aspects of  Madison’s foreign policy and was 
more than willing to collude with members of  Congress in order 
to accomplish his pro-war agenda.29 Instead of  presiding over an 
administration that would execute his wishes without question, 
Madison was mired down by Smith and his congressional allies 
within the Cabinet itself. 
The Senate had trodden over Madison and essentially 
planted one of  its own in his administration’s most important 
post. To accomplish his simplest foreign policy movements, the 
President had to outmaneuver his own primary diplomatic agent, 
who naturally held more of  an allegiance to Congress than his 
constitutional superior. Madison thought he could be his own 
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Secretary of  State, but by 1811, he finally had enough and 
demanded Smith’s resignation after a bitter series of  published 
exchanges regarding their differences.30 This first incident only 
reinforced the growing characterization that Madison would 
more or less accept Congress running roughshod over him 
whenever it pleased in order to avert inner-governmental conflict. 
Time after time in the coming years, Madison would propose 
diplomatic action to Congress that would ultimately die for lack 
of  executive inclination to exert political pressure.31 As one shall 
see, the leadership of  the young 12th Congress would prove more 
effective in pressuring the legislative-minded Madison to enact 
their will rather than his own.
THE HOUSE THAT CLAY BUILT
The combination of  an unusually large freshmen 
population in the 12th Congress, the rapid expansion of  the 
nation’s legislative apportionments (particularly in the West), 
the fracturing of  the two-party system, and the stewardship of  
a hesitant and ambivalent President precipitated the dynamic 
developments in the legislative branch’s foreign policy agency. 
Through political and institutional change within, due to 
the rapid proliferation in the body’s membership mentioned 
earlier, the House of  Representatives in particular would 
become the bellwether of  major developments in this unusual 
era of  legislative preeminence in international affairs. The 
monumental transformations in the making were portended by 
the unprecedented election of  Henry Clay as Speaker of  the 
House on November 4, 1811, the first day the 12th Congress 
convened.32 With the predetermined support of  his War Hawks 
faction, Clay was chosen from a cadre of  well-known Republican 
veterans to lead the House in his first day in the legislative body. 
Never before (excluding the first session of  the House in 1789) 
had a freshman been elected to lead the chamber, a feat that has 
since not yet been replicated. Clay’s elevation to the Speakership 
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signaled the tremendous authority that the House’s young 
freshmen would wield beginning on day one of  the first session, 
as well as the unparalleled period of  institutional and political 
change in Congress that the War Hawks were about to unleash.
Almost in diametric opposition to the institution one 
knows in the present age, the House of  Representatives was 
an indistinctly-formed body that lacked specialization and 
hierarchy. As discussed earlier, the Jeffersonian Republican 
ideal of  equality among legislators dictated that the House of  
Representatives operate much more in the way one thinks of  
the Senate today: members more or less had equal speaking 
rights and opportunities to serve on select committees, while 
strong leadership positions and rigid disciplinary structures 
were virtually absent. All forms of  hierarchy and specialization 
were looked upon with suspicion, meaning that clear leadership 
Although this image depicts Clay speaking in the Senate Chamber in 
1850, the Kentuckian was known for his oration and leadership skills 
throughout Congress
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chains or substantive standing committees were not present.33 
Although likely not realized at the time, even by Clay himself, 
the Kentucky freshman’s elevation to the Speakership was a 
major institutional milestone in American political history that 
would have major implications for the distribution of  power in 
the House of  Representatives and for bringing about the end 
of  the idealized Jeffersonian legislative system. Until that point, 
the Speakership had been largely apolitical and constitutional 
in nature, mimicking the presiding officer of  the British House 
of  Commons. The Speaker enforced House rules and ensured 
that members were accorded equal rights and fair opportunities 
to speak, but normally abstained from active political processes 
occurring within the body. In attempting to further his legislative 
goal of  declaring war on Great Britain, Clay transformed the 
position into one of  unrivaled political authority in the Congress, 
perhaps second nationwide only to the President of  the United 
States.34 
As mentioned before, Clay’s power play was facilitated by 
his War Hawks faction, of  which he was the undisputed leader; 
thus, Clay became the first Speaker of  the House who was 
simultaneously a party leader. Given that both the Democratic-
Republicans and the Federalists lacked a clearly delineated 
structure of  party leadership within either chamber—a feature 
that was to hasten their respective downfalls in the coming 
decades—political leadership had previously originated in the 
executive branch either from Cabinet secretaries or the President 
himself. Clay’s War Hawks changed this. Although they were a 
minority within the Republican Party, these energetic freshmen 
organized themselves remarkably well and coalesced aggressively 
behind a coherent platform of  war with Great Britain. The result 
was a bending of  wills in an amorphous and fractious Republican 
Party that had not filled the leadership vacuum created by 
President Jefferson’s departure from national politics. 
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Holding the Speakership with a partisan mandate from 
his War Hawks, Clay steadily manipulated the position’s nascent 
powers in order to accomplish his faction’s primary objective 
of  declaring war on Great Britain in 1812 and of  effectively 
contriving the major political office that one knows today as 
a byproduct of  that charge. Clay interpreted the House rules 
to further his faction’s war mission, used his constitutional 
discretion to set the chamber’s agenda, and controlled debate 
recognition while sometimes participating and voting, hitherto 
unseen in the Speakership.35 But of  all the Speaker’s powers that 
Clay manipulated to gain undisputed command of  the House’s 
legislation and political action, the most significant was the 
committee appointment powers. The powers themselves were 
a result of  the previously mentioned growth of  the House: it 
had been the original custom for the entire House to elect the 
membership of  every committee as the Senate still continued to 
do, but the need for expediency in an exponentially-expanded 
legislative body forced the House to defer to the Speaker’s best 
judgment.36
Although generally expected to be fair and impartial in 
appointing, Clay did not deploy this power neutrally. Immediately 
after his election, he packed committees with War Hawks and 
other members loyal to him, while appointing faithful chairmen 
to help him prosecute the House’s war mission.37 As a result, 
Clay had consolidated extensive powers into the Speakership 
against the backdrop of  the war charge in early 1812. As both 
party leader and presiding officer of  the House, he was able 
to empower the War Hawks with unprecedented influence in 
driving the House agenda, while crushing his opposition in both 
established parties through ruthless exercise of  the Speaker’s 
constitutional authorities as a means of  keeping order.38 In 
observing the dangers of  Clay’s rapid concentration of  authority 
within the Speakership, Josiah Quincy III (F-MA) remarked in a 
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floor speech, “His power is, in truth, the power of  the House.”39
Of  course, Clay’s maneuvers were not without backlash; 
when the Speaker appeared to be willing to use his recognition 
powers to curb the length of  debate given the size of  the body 
and the necessity for swift action, Representative Hugh Nelson 
(DR-VA) proffered an amendment to the House Rules so that 
“when the previous question is ordered to be taken, upon the 
main question being put, every member, who has not already 
spoken, shall have the liberty to speak once.”40 While Nelson was 
also a Republican, he was closely allied with Representative John 
Randolph and his ultra-conservative Tertium Quid Republicans, 
who quickly became Clay and the War Hawks’ main opposition. 
As a sign that Clay’s anti-war opposition was mounting, 
Nelson’s amendment was also defended by members of  the 
Federalist minority who were also reeling for a shot at the young 
Speaker. Others lamented Clay’s manipulation of  the Speaker’s 
committee appointment powers to satisfy his political will for 
war. Representative Samuel Taggart (F-MA) noted that even a 
random selection of  committee chairs would result in “more 
respectable chairmen than those placed in that situation by the 
Speaker. The business however itself  of  the Speaker selecting at 
pleasure the characters composing the several committees is in 
itself  a monstrous feature in our Government.”41
But this opposition would be unable to ground the 
rising Western Star, who more than anyone in the entire nation 
was adamantly leading the country into war. Even some of  his 
greatest political rivals, including then-Representative Daniel 
Webster (F-NH), could not deny the power that Clay had 
wielded in the Speaker’s chair. His lifelong friend and biographer 
summarized Clay’s position during the 12th and 13th Congresses: 
“Certainly, no one has ever presided over any deliberative body, 
in this country, with more personal popularity and influence 
than Mr. Clay. He governed the House with more absoluteness 
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than any Speaker who preceded or followed him.”42 Through 
the course of  the 1812 warpath, the Speaker would only further 
cultivate his power; as a result, Clay’s practices have become the 
commonly-accepted prerogatives of  House Speakers and are the 
conventions that make the position so powerful today.
Externally and in terms of  relations with the other 
branches of  government, the consolidation of  authority in a 
dominant Speaker empowered the House of  Representatives 
to promote its constitutional and political interests through 
the recognition of  its single and directly accountable voice for 
the large chamber. With the realistic promise of  swift political 
action and party discipline, the Speaker could now negotiate 
authoritatively in meetings with both the Senate and the 
President, and that is exactly what Clay did. Beginning in the 
spring of  1812, he and other House leaders began regularly 
initiating meetings with the President and his Cabinet to advance 
their war charge. The consolidation of  the House’s leadership 
powers in the Speaker would further the lower chamber’s external 
agency and give the War Hawks tremendous leverage over both 
its legislative counterpart and the Executive Branch. Since the 
Constitution only stipulates that the Speaker is a presiding officer 
for the House in a parallel fashion to the Vice President and 
President Pro Tempore in the Senate, it is fascinating to consider 
that the Speakership may have never become more than what 
the Presidency of  the Senate or its British antecedent are without 
Clay’s formative machinations in pursuit of  the war goals of  
1812.
Clay was also riding the waves of  the second major 
institutional transformation in the House of  Representatives: 
the standing committee system. Since the 1st Congress (1789-
1791), both the House and the Senate had opted not to create 
a formalized standing committee system. Instead they retained 
the Continental Congress’ previously discussed practice of  
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appointing temporary “select committees” as needed. In keeping 
with a common belief  held especially among Jeffersonian 
Republicans that the Congress should accord equal standing 
for all legislators, select committees were preferred as a way 
of  diminishing specialization and hierarchy in both chambers 
while retaining the majority’s authority. Many lawmakers also 
began to view temporary select committees as a way to guard 
against undue executive influence. During the first years of  the 
new government under the Constitution, Alexander Hamilton, 
Secretary of  the Treasury and father of  the Federalist Party, 
favored the referral of  legislative proposals to executive 
departments before congressional committees in keeping in 
line with his program to build a government characterized by 
a dominant executive branch.43 The Jeffersonian Republicans 
though, who gained control of  the House in the 2nd Congress, 
vehemently opposed this proposed practice under their doctrine 
of  legislative supremacy. This controversy of  institutional 
organization had followed on the heels of  the Pacificus-Helvidius 
debates and further contributed to the great partisan divide 
between the Federalists and the Republicans in the 1790s.
In response to Hamilton’s advances, congressional 
Republicans had barred the President, Cabinet secretaries, and 
other executive agents from initiating reports, coming to speak 
on the House floor, and introducing legislation in Congress, 
conventions that have remained in effect to the present day. All 
were measures taken to combat the growing concern that “the 
Executive had swallowed up the legislative branch,” as Jefferson 
had put it. By the end of  the Washington Administration and the 
first four Congresses, the House and the Senate had both solidly 
committed to developing their own methods for obtaining 
information and for gaining expertise that was independent of  
executive officers and agencies.44 Defeating Hamilton’s procedural 
design and asserting full legislative autonomy “put an end to a 
tendency that could have moved the country in the direction 
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of  British cabinet government,” as historian George Goodwin 
noted in attributing the reasons that the U.S. government 
developed with separate but equal branches despite Congress’ 
original institutional similarity to the British Parliament.45
Although the institution of  the committee provided 
Congress with the means to resist undue executive influence, 
the House of  Representatives and the Senate still largely relied 
only on temporary select committees to fill the essential duties 
of  conducting reports and authoring legislation by the time that 
Clay entered the legislative body. The common practice at the 
time was for the entire House to resolve itself  into a “Committee 
of  the Whole,” not only to hammer out the essential elements 
of  any legislation in open debate, but also to assign a select 
committee to fulfill that action further, although with very 
specific instructions. The lack of  independent, permanent, and 
specialized committees owed itself  to the widespread Jeffersonian 
belief  that “committees with substantial policy discretion and 
permanence might distort the will of  the majority.”46 Thus, select 
committees were dissolved immediately upon completion of  
their carefully delineated task.
But by the end of  the first decade of  the nineteenth century, 
the House, due to its growing size, was finding it inexpedient 
and impractical for the body to resolve aspects of  legislation and 
other actions before committing it to a lower panel. The remedy 
was the standing committee, a subset of  the legislative body with 
well-defined membership, a fixed subject-matter jurisdiction, 
and an indefinite lifespan, rolling over from one Congress to the 
next.47 The permanency and specialized autonomy of  standing 
committees enabled the House to generate more legislation, 
gather more intelligence, exercise greater oversight powers over 
the executive branch, and enhance legislative activism in virtually 
all respects. While the House’s small standing committee system 
was no more than a rudimentary fixture by the 12th Congress, 
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the institution would continue to mature with every session until 
blossoming right before the 1820s.48
For those Tertium Quid Republicans such as John 
Randolph who opposed both specialization and hierarchy in the 
legislature, Clay’s manipulation of  the Speaker’s appointment 
powers was doubly painful at a time when committees were 
gaining more practical autonomy through the growing practice 
of  granting themselves independence to report legislation 
on their own volition, rather than solely by commission of  
the Committee of  the Whole. While Clay only presided over 
the creation of  two new standing committees during the War 
Congresses and referred more business to his packed select 
committees, he would press for a fully-institutionalized system 
after the War of  1812, possibly to keep order in reaction to the 
breakdown of  his secure war coalition.49
While the warpath to 1812 facilitated dynamic 
developments in the House of  Representatives, the Senate 
remained relatively static during the course of  the 12th and 13th 
Congresses. Whereas the House was in the process of  laying 
down a standing committee system and selecting a powerful 
presiding officer in the eventful months leading up to war, the 
Senate remained the slow and cerebral body that the Framers of  
the Constitution no doubt had in mind. The Senate’s standing 
committee system would not be created until 1816, while the 
body’s small size and its lack of  a centralized leadership structure, 
specialized policy units, and electoral turnover relegated it 
to a position of  receiving the major foreign policy initiatives 
of  the day from either the House or the President. Thus, the 
majority of  the aggressive legislation related to the war and other 
overseas endeavors originated in the House during the years of  
1811 through 1815.50 This difference in initiative between the 
two chambers reflected their respective paces of  institutional 
development, especially with regards to standing committee 
Penn History Review     63 
The War That Congress Waged
establishment.
While the House had slowly adopted a standing committee 
system (especially perpetuated during the past few years by the 
demands of  the war), the Senate had remained relatively stagnant 
and unchanging. Now in one fell swoop, it adopted a fully-fleshed 
network of  standing committees and surpassed the House with 
just one motion (the House’s standing committee system was 
still immature, with a sizable amount of  jurisdictions still under 
semi-standing committees, including foreign affairs). Although 
the senators, likely did not realize at the time the gravity of  
this motion, their adoption of  its institutional changes would 
fundamentally alter the upper house forever and decisively usher 
in the age of  American government by committee that one 
arguably still lives in to this day. 
The difference in legislative initiative was also reflected 
in public sentiment, which considered the Senate as the duller of  
the two powers in the legislative branch. Whereas Senate sessions 
were short and featured few speeches, the much greater volume 
and breadth of  colorful debate within the House ensured much 
wider publicity and awareness of  that chamber. It is consistently 
recorded during this period that while reporters jostled for 
position in the House gallery, the Senate scarcely attracted an 
audience; newspaper volume certainly reflected that.51 Writing 
to Secretary of  State James Monroe in late 1810, Clay reflected 
on his decision to run for election to the House despite his 
position in the Senate: “Accustomed to the popular branch 
of  the Legislature, and preferring the turbulence (if  I may be 
allowed the term) of  a numerous body to the solemn stillness of  
the Senate chamber, it was a mere matter of  taste that led me, 
perhaps injudiciously, to change my station.”52 While the dullness 
of  the chamber may have corresponded to the lack of  legislative 
initiative, the Senate’s deliberative manner had its own ways of  
influencing the war charge by acting as the brakes on the House’s 
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breakneck speed.
THE COERCION CHARGE
After exploring why the 12th Congress, the first 
“War Congress,” was in many ways a novel body and how it 
initiated many of  the institutional transformations that would 
accommodate the new legislative assertiveness of  its younger 
War Hawk members in particular, the actual path to and through 
the War of  1812 is equally riddled with legislation embodying a 
new diplomatic assertiveness in Congress. While the purpose of  
this work is not to document how Congress legislated the War 
of  1812, this paper will explore how the legislative body led the 
nation into the war and will investigate its impact on cultivating 
a new age of  congressional assertiveness in foreign affairs by the 
end of  the military conflict. The 12th Congress opened in the 
wake of  a series of  diplomatic volleys between the United States, 
Great Britain, and France that had begun shortly after President 
Madison had taken office two years earlier in March 1809.
Where Jefferson’s disastrous Embargo Act of  1807 had 
failed to assert American neutrality in shipping rights, Madison 
proposed an honorable peace when relations with Britain briefly 
improved in the honeymoon of  his administration: the British 
would repeal the Orders in Council (1807), which dictated seizure 
of  neutral shipping to France and to French continental allies, 
and the U.S. would repeal the recently-passed Non-Intercourse 
Act (1809), which prevented trade with both Great Britain and 
France.53 After Congress wholeheartedly accommodated this 
agreement with appropriate legislation in June 1809, Madison 
regretfully announced that the British Cabinet had rejected the 
agreement he had negotiated with British Minister to the U.S. 
David Erskine.54 And so, the trade restrictions were reenacted 
and the economic hostilities resumed. The relationship with 
Great Britain was deteriorating with each passing day.
Penn History Review     65 
The War That Congress Waged
With Madison’s diplomatic efforts faltering, Congress 
decided to take matters into its own hands through the legislative 
process. Out of  the House Foreign Affairs Committee (still a 
select, or temporary, committee at this time), Chairman Nathaniel 
Macon (DR-NC) reported legislation supported by the executive 
administration (and championed by Madison’s Secretary of  the 
Treasury Albert Gallatin) that restricted French and British ships 
from trading in American ports. Macon’s Bill No. 1, as it became 
known, also stipulated that the President would be authorized 
to issue a proclamation lifting the sanction on either power that 
removed its edicts violating American neutrality. Nonetheless, 
the Invisibles in the Senate, who considered anything touched by 
Gallatin anathema, thoroughly amended Macon’s Bill No. 1 and 
sent it back to the House. After exchanging amendments amid 
fierce debate across both chambers for most of  the 1810 session, 
the House eventually acquiesced to the Senate and enacted a 
revised version that what would be called Macon’s Bill No. 2 on 
May 1, 1810, which Madison begrudgingly signed into law.55 
The new revision on international trade law lifted all bans 
on commerce with Britain and France for three months. If  either 
one of  the two nations repealed their edicts on seizing American 
shipping during this period, the President of  the United States 
would be compelled to proclaim a renewed embargo on the 
other (unless that nation also repealed its offensive edicts).56 
Congress hoped that one of  the two European powers would 
see an opportunity to damage their arch-nemesis through this 
legislation, and Emperor of  the French Napoleon Bonaparte 
did not disappoint the federal legislature. The French Emperor 
was quick to assure Madison that he would comply with the 
Americans to spite the British. In compliance with Congress’ 
legislation, Madison then issued a proclamation lifting any 
restriction on France and renewing the embargo on Britain. 
But to the Americans’ horror, Napoleon quietly reneged on 
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his promises and allowed French ships to continue marauding 
vessels originating from the United States. Meanwhile, tensions 
with Great Britain were at an all-time high: accidental naval 
skirmishes in 1811, first between the U.S.S. Spitfire and the 
H.M.S. Guerriere and then fifteen days later between the U.S.S. 
President and H.M.S. Little Belt, renewed concerns that the British 
were encroaching on American waters and impressing American 
sailors and citizens in the British Royal Navy. In these two naval 
incidents that smacked of  the Chesapeake-Leopard Affair with 
Britain just four years earlier and in the total inability to hold 
Napoleon to his word, the American public could not help but 
feel that the 11th Congress and President Madison had brought 
them back to square one.
This was the dire state of  affairs when the 12th Congress 
arrived in Washington D.C. to begin their session early at the behest 
of  the President. Clay and his allies immediately used Madison’s 
opening message reporting on the breakdown in diplomacy to 
appoint a new House Foreign Relations Committee that was to 
be headed by Chairman Peter B. Porter (DR-NY) and would also 
include War Hawk leaders Calhoun and Grundy. Unfortunately, 
Clay would also be forced to observe traditional seniority 
conventions and appoint John Randolph to the committee, but 
Clay hoped his War Hawks would drown out the shrill of  his 
dogged opposition leader.57 The committee immediately became 
the focal point in the American charge towards hostilities with 
Britain; just a little over a week later, the committee completed 
a report on the Little Belt Affair and concluded that the nation 
should prepare for the eventuality of  war by raising 10,000 regulars 
in the standing army and by providing for the contingency of  
50,000 volunteers.58 Upon formally introducing the report to the 
whole House for deliberation, Chairman Porter had no qualms 
in stating unequivocally that “it was the determination of  the 
committee to recommend open and decided war.”59
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Together with his colleague Senator William Branch 
Giles (DR-VA), de facto pro-war leader of  the Republicans 
in the Senate, Clay managed the charge for war by carefully 
controlling the flow of  defense legislation out of  committees in 
Congress.60 Over the course of  the next four months, Congress 
mainly legislated provisions for the war: in January, it provided 
for an army of  25,000 regulars (which the skeptical Randolph 
scoffed at) and appropriated $1.9 million in armaments for both 
the army and the navy; in February, it enacted controversial 
tax articles to finance the war; and in March, ig directed the 
President to borrow up to $11 million at six percent interest 
in order to meet any war-related contingencies.61 But in reality, 
these measures did little to truly prepare the armed forces (which 
relied almost entirely on local militias due to Republican fears of  
a national standing army) for war with the British. In an effort to 
save money, most articles were to be invoked only in the event 
that war was officially declared. Cutting corners on the defense 
legislation would cost the nation dearly in the coming conflict.62 
Clay and his allies were poised for success in the House by 
assembling a dominant coalition of  war-supporting members. 
All that remained was coercing those last holdouts in the Senate 
and in the White House into accepting what the War Hawks had 
already proclaimed was necessary.
By March 1812, President Madison was besieged on all 
sides by those treating war with Britain as inevitable. But he was 
reluctant to accept the dismal prospect of  prosecuting a war 
that he believed the nation was unprepared for, and deployed 
peace envoys to Britain to discuss terms under which war could 
be averted. Meanwhile, Clay and the House Republicans could 
hardly restrain themselves from knocking down the doors of  
the White House in their haste for war. Employing his mandate 
in the House, the Speaker designed a wholesale program for the 
executive administration to follow step-by-step so that Congress 
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could declare war. Through his actions, Clay was setting new 
markers in the relationship between the executive and the 
legislature, enhancing the agency and the initiative of  the latter. 
In a March 16 note to Secretary of  State Monroe, the Speaker 
directed:
That the President recommend an Embargo to last say 
30 days, by a confidential message: That a termination 
of  the Embargo be followed by War: and, That he also 
recommend provision for the acceptance of  10,000 
volunteers for a short period, whose officers are to be 
commissioned by the President. 
In the margins of  the same note, Clay explained why he was 
pursuing such vigorous action from the executive: 
Altho’ the power of  declaring War belongs to Congress, 
I do not see that it less falls within the scope of  the 
President’s constitutional duty to recommend such 
measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient than 
any other which, being suggested by him, they alone can 
adopt.63
Clay thus instituted the convention in American political 
tradition for the President to send a war message to Congress before 
such a declaration was given.64 The President, apparently also of  
the opinion that the embargo should precede any declaration of  
war, acceded to the Speaker’s demands with the condition that 
it be sixty days long so that the diplomatic mission to Britain on 
the U.S.S. Hornet would have ample time to return. On April 1, 
1812, the President’s message was delivered to Congress as Clay 
had stipulated. As the measure was being debated in the House, 
Representative Randolph gained the floor and denounced the 
origins of  Madison’s recommendation: “it comes to us in a very 
questionable shape or rather in an unquestionable state… and is 
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not the wish or measure of  the Executive.”65 Randolph claimed 
that it was the House Foreign Relations Committee, not President 
Madison, which had designed the plan for an embargo followed 
by war and that the committee’s manipulation was leading the 
nation headstrong into an undesirable conflict.66 He was not far 
off  from the truth: Clay and his cohorts were orchestrating the 
war efforts in both political branches of  government through 
coercion and the newly-pronounced powers of  Congress that 
the young Speaker had managed to master in the course of  a few 
months. After some changes in the Senate, Congress enacted a 
90-day embargo. 
Sometime following the adoption of  this embargo, 
a committee of  War Hawk congressmen led by Speaker Clay 
forced a private meeting with Madison to discuss the President’s 
reluctance to commit to war. As was the case for the public 
then, there is no transcript or records of  that encounter; the 
proceedings were and still are entirely open to speculation by 
those not privy to its details. In fact, there may have been two 
separate meetings spread out between April and May, the first 
one regarding the War Hawks’ desire to strike a potential plan 
Madison was formulating to send fresh peace envoys to Britain 
and the second one involving the faction’s desire to force Madison 
to send a message to Congress asking for war. While the number 
of  meetings or the precise discussion may never be known, 
Federalists and Tertium Quid Republicans seemed confident in 
what was transpiring in front of  their eyes: Clay and the War 
Hawks were twisting the President’s arm in their insatiable quest 
for war. They claimed that the members had threatened to use 
the previously-discussed power of  the congressional caucus to 
withhold Madison’s re-nomination for President in 1812. They 
also denounced the act by implicating Clay and the War Hawks in 
floor speeches, letters, and newspaper articles for years to come; 
historians have still not resolved to what degree these coercive 
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meetings affected the nation’s entrance into the War of  1812. 
What can be ascertained, however, is that at least one of  the 
meetings did occur in May and pressure was applied in some 
fashion on Madison to produce a war message in the same 
manner Clay had demanded that the President recommend the 
embargo. Whether it was because the congressional faction left 
him with no other choice or because he sincerely believed that 
war was necessary, Madison would ultimately acquiesce to the 
War Hawks’ expectations. His decision was reinforced by the 
return of  the U.S.S. Hornet from Europe bearing no news of  
concessions from the British.67
On June 1, 1812, President Madison sent a confidential 
message to Congress outlining the grievances of  the United 
States against Great Britain and the current state of  affairs 
between the two countries, concluding, “We behold, in fine, 
on the side of  Great Britain, a state of  war against the United 
States, and on the side of  the United States a state of  peace 
toward Great Britain.”68 Madison recounted the reasons why his 
countrymen were so distressed: impressment of  citizens on the 
high seas, seizures of  naval vessels, violation of  neutral trade, 
encouragement of  Native American raids in the west, and a 
general lack of  regard for the sovereignty of  the nation. But the 
President did not go so far as to explicitly ask the Congress to 
declare war, instead deferring to the Congress to deliberate the 
necessity of  war:
Whether the United States shall continue passive under 
these progressive usurpations and these accumulating 
wrongs, or, opposing force to force in defense of  
their national rights, shall commit a just cause into the 
hands of  the Almighty Disposer of  Events, avoiding 
all connections which might entangle it in the contest 
or views of  other powers, and preserving a constant 
readiness to concur in an honorable re-establishment 
Penn History Review     71 
The War That Congress Waged
of  peace and friendship, is a solemn question which 
the Constitution wisely confides to the Legislative 
Department of  the Government. In recommending it to 
their early deliberations I am happy in the assurance that 
the decision will be worthy the enlightened and patriotic 
councils of  a virtuous, a free, and a powerful nation.69
While Madison had certainly documented the extent to 
which British offenses constituted substantial threats to American 
sovereignty, his conclusion clearly lacked a decisive call to action. 
Never before (or never since) had there been such a vague “war 
message” delivered by a president to Congress. Astonishingly, 
Madison outlined equally the benefits of  not only a declaration 
of  war, but also those of  maintaining the peaceful status quo. 
One reads this conclusion and doubts whether he believed the 
U.S. should commit to war at all, and wonders if  Congress was 
truly influenced by the presidential message as it has been on 
several occasions since. Madison’s skepticism about declaring 
war was further complicated by his ambivalence over the role 
that he, as President, would play in resolving the complication at 
hand. Ultimately, without any appreciable executive pressure, the 
decision was truly left to the legislative body that had instigated 
armed conflict in the first place: the House of  Representatives.
Immediately following the war message, Randolph and 
his Tertium Quid Republicans moved that the measures for war 
be considered by a Committee of  the Whole. The majority of  
the House rejected this measure and Speaker Clay gained a major 
victory: the House Foreign Relations Committee would have sole 
jurisdiction of  drafting the articles of  war. This was a significant 
moment in the House’s history, as it confirmed the viability of  
the House Foreign Relations Committee as an autonomous unit 
that would generate its own opinions and legislation, well-suited 
to efficiently accomplish its diplomatic goals in insulation from 
rogue elements in the legislative body. Now-Chairman John 
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C. Calhoun led his committee to its private chambers to begin 
preparing a report and resolution for declaring war on Great 
Britain. Two days later, the South Carolina freshman would 
announce the committee’s findings: “The period has arrived 
when the United States must support their character and station 
among the Nations of  the Earth, or submit to the most shameful 
degradation.”70 It seemed from the swiftness of  the House’s 
mobilization (it was rumored that Calhoun’s report had already 
been written in the previous month) and the apparent origin 
of  the message’s impetus in Congress that Madison’s message 
was merely being employed by the War Hawks as an obligatory 
symbol to assuage concerns that the executive branch was not 
prepared to prosecute the war. With the way in which the war 
was about to unfold, it would seem as though these concerns 
were well-founded.
The House easily adopted the House Foreign Relations 
Committee’s report and its draft of  the declaration of  war on 
Great Britain, 79 yeas to 49 nays.71 Clay then had the engrossed 
resolution sent to the Senate for its consideration, beginning on 
June 14. The next thirteen days would leave Washington D.C. 
in limbo and the nation in suspense, as the Senate debated 
war behind closed doors. With the Clintonians, Invisibles, and 
Administration Republicans all favoring different forms of  war 
and the Tertium Quid Republicans as well as the Federalists 
opposing war outright, the process was excruciatingly painful; 
amendment after amendment and philosophical debate after 
debate mired the Senate down in procedure. The Senate’s 
convention of  unlimited speaking certainly did not hasten the 
process. In total, there were over eight key votes on war measures 
during the process; many were decided within the margin of  only 
one or two votes. Ultimately, the Senate adopted the House’s 
resolution, 19 yeas to 13 nays; this remains the slimmest margin 
in either chamber for a declaration of  war in American history.72
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Clay and the War Hawks finally had their war; they 
had successfully silenced their opposition in the Tertium Quid 
Republicans and Federalists while bullying the White House into 
accepting the burden of  prosecuting a daunting campaign against 
perhaps the greatest power on Earth at the time. Moreover, they 
had proven in the first major instance since the ratification of  
the Constitution that the impetus for landmark action in foreign 
policy could originate within Congress. No matter to what degree 
President Madison and his Cabinet may have favored war, the 
clear leadership had emanated from Congress. But Clay and his 
allies were about to learn that declaring war was by far the easiest 
part in the strenuous and bloody process of  directing the nation 
through conflict; the coming war was going to test Congress 
and make even its most ardent proponents of  war ponder the 
outcome they had so jubilantly celebrated in 1812.
WESTERN HEMISPHERE RISING
The war charge of  1812 produced another development 
in congressional statecraft whose significance has not been fully 
explored. With the prospect of  war seeming to dominate every 
aspect of  the country’s international consciousness when the 12th 
Congress opened session in late 1811, lawmakers searched for 
every possible opportunity to extend pressure on Britain beyond 
the single dimension of  bilateral Anglo-American relations; 
legislators realized that pressure could and must also be levied 
upon British allies and proxies in the Western Hemisphere. 
American leaders were particularly tempted by the possibility 
of  encumbering Britain’s key ally, Spain, whose vast empire 
remained a major impediment to U.S. ambitions to expand across 
the Americas.73 The opportunity seemed to present itself  in the 
crescendo of  the Age of  Democratic Revolutions in the colonial 
arenas of  Latin America. On the western shores of  the Atlantic, 
the Americas brimmed with the revolutionary energies first 
unleashed in the United States, France, and Haiti. The conflicts 
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were sparked by Napoleon’s invasion of  the Iberian Peninsula 
in 1808, which launched Spain and Portugal into absolute 
disarray. King Charles IV of  Spain was forced from his throne, 
while Portugal’s royal family fled for Colonial Brazil to escape 
Napoleon’s clutches; both the central governments in Madrid, 
Spain and Lisbon, Portugal collapsed with little warning to their 
imperial possessions.74
The Emperor of  the French installed his brother, 
Joseph Bonaparte, on the Spanish throne at the head of  a proxy 
government that claimed the entirety of  Spain’s vast overseas 
possessions. However, the reality was that Napoleon had chopped 
off  rather than replaced the head of  the already moribund Spanish 
Empire. With no central authority in Latin America remaining, 
the Spanish and Portuguese colonies established their own local 
juntas that claimed varying degrees of  loyalty to the beleaguered 
House of  Bourbon in opposition to the Bonapartists. Despite 
the nominal profession of  loyalty to Spain by many of  the Latin 
American colonies, major political and social upheaval that had 
been swelling beneath centuries of  rigid imperial rule was just 
beginning to touch the surface.75 Congress was well aware of  these 
profound developments in Latin America, considering the advent 
of  revolutionary movements a particularly timely opportunity 
for American statecraft in light of  the rivalry with Great Britain. 
Given that Spain was one of  Britain’s most important allies and 
that there was a chronic lack of  compassionate feeling between 
the U.S. and its imperial neighbor, there were many in both the 
House and the Senate of  the 12th Congress who wished to see 
the United States capitalize on developments southward in order 
to enhance American power and deter British influence. 
By 1810, President Madison and Secretary Monroe had 
deployed various classes of  agents across Latin America to 
provide reconnaissance on the deteriorating situations in the 
various colonies to the south, as well as to foster relationships 
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for American political and economic interests. Much to the 
expense of  their own nation’s interests, American agents 
witnessed the British making inroads with the revolutionary 
juntas by obtaining most favorable statuses in trade agreements 
and building hegemony over the region in the absence of  any 
comparable power.76 Given the collapse of  Spain and Portugal 
and the preoccupation of  France, the United States was the only 
nation in a position to independently deter the growing British 
influence in the Western Hemisphere. 
Although the Madison Administration had begun 
appointing agents across Latin America, harboring revolutionaries 
in the U.S., and allowing them to purchase munitions, there 
were still many gaps that needed to be filled in order to craft an 
acceptable American grand strategy to resist the British threat. But 
while the British were clearly winning on the ground, American 
agents suggested that it may not be too late to mount a challenge; 
there was discontent with the imperial superpower in nations 
such as Buenos Aires (later Argentina) and Venezuela, with many 
revolutionaries viewing the intensifying British imperial influence 
with suspicion. At the same time, these revolutionaries looked to 
their neighbor to the north to provide them with the natural 
support they felt they deserved in their efforts to proclaim 
independence under the banner of  republicanism.77 American 
agents stressed that the U.S. could use minimal resources to begin 
building its own rival sphere of  influence over the tumultuous 
dominions of  Latin America.
Correspondence with the Venezuelan Congress that 
implored assistance for their cause of  full independence 
provided the perfect opportunity for the U.S. to commit its 
attention southward while the great European powers were 
occupied in their struggle with Napoleon for control of  their 
own continent. There were many in the House and the Senate 
who looked favorably upon this development and supported an 
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American insertion in the revolutions of  Latin America. Chief  
among those in Congress intent on architecting a comprehensive 
Western Hemisphere policy in an era of  emerging juntas was none 
other than Henry Clay.78 The young Speaker would have his first 
of  many opportunities to shift the House’s attention southward 
after President Madison delivered his first message to the 12th 
Congress on November 5, 1811. While the communication was 
largely devoted to the ongoing tensions with Great Britain and 
other matters of  diplomatic importance, Madison mentioned 
in passing, “it is impossible to overlook those developing 
themselves among the great communities which occupy the 
Southern portion of  our own hemisphere, and extend into our 
neighborhood.”79
As was the practice at the time, the House of  
Representatives resolved itself  into several select committees 
based on particular topics touched upon in the President’s 
message to provide a substantial congressional response either 
in the form of  a report and/or some appropriate legislative 
action. Physician and scientist Dr. Samuel Latham Mitchill 
(DR-NY) was chosen as the chairman of  the committee that 
was referred to address the small portion of  the President’s 
message that related to the Spanish American colonies. The 
following month, Representative Mitchill wrote to Secretary of  
State Monroe to request that any discrete information available 
regarding the independence of  Spanish American colonies be 
released to the House committee.80 Responding to Mitchill’s 
request, Secretary Monroe furnished a copy of  Venezuela’s 
declaration of  independence. According to Monroe, this 
copy had been specifically transmitted to the United States 
government by order of  the “Congress, composed of  deputies 
from those [Venezuelan] provinces, assembled at Caracas.”81 The 
House committee now knew that the Venezuelan Congress was 
actively soliciting the attention of  the United States, undoubtedly 
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seeking the legitimacy and support of  the first republic in the 
Western Hemisphere in their struggle for a certain measure 
of  sovereignty. Although this is the only such declaration that 
Monroe had received by the date of  his letter on December 9, 
1811, Monroe informed Mitchill, “it is known that most, if  not 
all of  them [Spanish American colonies], on the continent, are in 
a revolutionary state.”82
On December 10, Representative Mitchill reported on 
behalf  of  the House select committee on Spanish American 
colonies. Specifically, Mitchill presented a report on the origins 
and status of  the Latin American revolutions and recommended 
the adoption of  a resolution encouraging the establishment of  
independent democratic and federal unions by revolutionary 
forces in the Spanish American colonies:
Whereas several of  the American Spanish provinces, 
have represented to the United States that it has been 
found expedient for them to associate and form Federal 
Governments upon the elective and representative plan, 
and to declare themselves free and independent—
Therefore be it 
Resolved, by the Senate and the House of  Representatives of  
the United States of  America in Congress assembled, That 
they behold, with friendly interest, the establishment 
of  independent sovereignties by the Spanish provinces 
in America, consequent upon the actual state of  the 
monarchy to which they belonged; that, as neighbors 
and inhabitants of  the same hemisphere, the United 
States feel great solicitude for their welfare; and that, 
when those provinces shall have attained the condition 
of  nations, by the just exercise of  their rights, the 
Senate and House of  Representatives will unite with 
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the Executive in establishing with them, as sovereign 
and independent States, such amicable relations and 
commercial intercourse as may require their Legislative 
authority.83
Mitchill’s report and its accompanying resolution was a remarkable 
first step in the formation of  a comprehensive American policy 
towards the burgeoning Latin American nations. While the 
young 12th Congress faced the daunting prospect of  war with 
the greatest sea power of  the age, it did not shy away from the 
prospect of  envisaging a grand framework for statecraft in the 
emerging community of  nations in the Western Hemisphere. 
The 12th Congress had gumption in proclaiming to Latin 
Americans that it felt “great solicitude for their welfare” and was 
congratulatory towards their ideological choice to dislodge the 
“actual state of  the monarchy to which they belonged.” 
As preeminent Western Hemisphere historian Arthur 
Preston Whitaker of  the University of  Pennsylvania pointed 
out in his landmark work, The United States and the Independence 
of  Latin America, 1800-1830, the Mitchill committee’s resolution 
was foundational because “it was the first statement of  the kind 
made by any organ of  the United States government.”84 The ideas 
expressed in the resolution defined two ideological principles that 
would become salient features in the language employed by U.S. 
politicians and officials to justify “solicitude” for the entirety of  
the Americas: hemispheric solidarity and republican fraternity. 
The former expressed the notion that the Western Hemisphere 
constituted a new world independent of  and removed from 
the European sphere, while the latter suggested that the U.S. 
felt obliged to care for the new Latin American nations due to 
their adoption of  the same republican and federal principles that 
characterized the U.S. Constitution. 
The sentiments of  Mitchill’s resolution would become 
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enshrined in American statecraft for decades to come as the 
justificatory cornerstone of  U.S. guardianship over the Western 
Hemisphere. These considerations in the select committee on 
the Spanish American colonies built upon the 11th Congress’ 
work just a year earlier in enacting the so-called “No Transfer 
Principle” by a joint resolution of  the House and the Senate. 
Tracing its origins to the Washington Administration and later 
arguments in Congress furnished by Federalists such as Senator 
Gouverneur Morris (F-NY), the No Transfer Principle sought 
to articulate U.S. opposition to the transfer of  certain colonial 
territories in the Americas from one European power to another, 
particularly Spanish colonies to British domain.85 This legislation 
would become another pillar of  American foreign policy in the 
nineteenth century.
Both the Mitchill Resolution and the preceding No 
Transfer Policy contained vital components of  the celebrated 
Monroe Doctrine of  1823. But while the Monroe Doctrine 
would only come over a decade after these first beginnings 
in Congress, the common narrative of  American diplomatic 
history seems to accord President James Monroe and Secretary 
of  State John Quincy Adams with complete credit for this now-
essential canon of  U.S. foreign policy principles. In other words, 
the Monroe Doctrine was an exceptional milestone architected 
with the energy of  the executive branch, however, the evolution 
of  this principle was at least a decade in the making and involved 
a collaborative process of  alternating action between both 
political branches of  government. The Mitchill Resolution was 
undoubtedly an important precedent to the Monroe Doctrine. 
Even the great American diplomatic historian Dexter Perkins 
mentioned the resolution in his discussion of  influences on 
the President’s foreign policy position in his tour de force, A 
History of  the Monroe Doctrine.86 Furthermore, it is important to 
realize that when President Monroe first unveiled the policy in 
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his speech, it did not seem at the time to be a groundbreaking 
transformation of  American foreign policy. In fact, between 
1825 and 1895, the “Monroe Doctrine” (as it would later become 
known) was almost absent as a recognized executive policy from 
the nation’s politics and history.87 When examining the full record 
of  policymaking with regards to U.S.-Latin American relations, 
the Monroe Doctrine seems unremarkable as a departure from 
existing foreign policy; it is more appropriate to consider it as 
a more substantive articulation of  policy that had already been 
burgeoning in Congress and the Department of  State for years 
since, at least, the Mitchill Resolution in 1811.
FIRST IN WAR, FIRST IN PEACE
While Clay and his allies had painted a rosy landscape 
of  a painless victory in which the U.S. would usurp the British 
from Canada and the entire hemisphere with little more than the 
Kentucky militia, the reality was that the young congressional 
faction had no clue as to how difficult it would be to wage war 
on the world’s foremost superpower at the time. Both before and 
after the 12th Congress took office in the fall of  1811, neither 
the House nor the Senate was inclined to seriously shoulder 
the tribulations necessary to arm the nation for its ostensibly 
“inevitable war.” This lack of  preparation translated onto the 
battlefields in the summer of  1812. In repudiating a solely sea-
based conflict and confirming that territorial expansion was 
indeed a goal of  the conflict, American forces first moved on 
Canada in a land expedition that was met with ignominious defeat 
and a counter-attack by the British on the garrison at Chicago in 
the U.S.-controlled Territory of  Illinois. When General Henry 
Dearborn attempted to resuscitate the American campaign 
in November, state militias refused to follow him into enemy 
territory; this served as a direct abrogation to Clay’s claims to the 
House earlier in the year that state militias could be relied upon 
for excursions into Canada.88 By the end of  1812, as Congress 
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reconvened in Washington D.C. for its second session, the 
American cause was looking lost before it had even really begun.
Now came the dirty work: Congress had to work with 
the executive administration to direct the war that the legislative 
body had produced. In his landmark dissertation, Congress During 
the War of  1812, William Ray Barlow chronicled the conduct 
of  the 12th and 13th Congresses and how they set precedents 
“criticizing, objecting, amending, and at times initiating war 
efforts.” While the President and Congress enjoyed a more 
collaborative relationship after the defeats of  1812, there were 
still several instances of  crossfire between the executive and the 
legislature on particular measures of  combat and diplomacy. Each 
attempted to influence the other with every new consideration. 
One such instance was the charter of  a national bank, which 
would become the central issue of  American politics in the 
coming decades: Congress insisted on instituting it to finance 
the war and President Madison resolved to veto the measure. 
Reverse instances came when the executive administration 
continually submitted appropriations necessary to maintain the 
war effort, with each item scrutinized by the House and rarely 
written off  in the amount requested.89
During the course of  the war, the House of  
Representatives was the leading body as it had been during the 
initiation of  the war. That chamber’s institutionalized committees 
and efficient, targeted operation resulted in its procurement of  
most war directives. Throughout the course of  the conflict, the 
Senate proved unable to manage the flood of  legislation the 
House sent; this would likely precipitate the establishment of  
the Senate’s own standing committee system after the conclusion 
of  the War of  1812. Meanwhile, the House considered major 
changes, including the institution of  a single Committee of  Public 
Defense to manage the war effort. After much deliberation about 
the practicality and safety of  such a system, the House resolved 
Penn History Review     82 
The War That Congress Waged
to create the Military Affairs Committee that collaborated with 
the executive administration in much the same way that the 
Continental Congress war committees cooperated with General 
George Washington during the American Revolutionary War. 
Although not officially a standing committee in its own 
right, the House Committee on Foreign Relations remained 
perhaps the most powerful panel in the body like in the previous 
session. It claimed jurisdiction over diplomatic affairs and 
the general spirit of  the war. In describing the committee’s 
aggrandized role in the course of  the war, Representative Samuel 
Taggart (F-MA) wrote that it was “a junta composed of  5, 6, 7, 
8, or 10 [members]….” Representative John Randolph, prone to 
exaggeration, charged that the Committee on Foreign Relations 
had “outstripped the Executive [President Madison].” Randolph 
further implored, “Shall we form a committee of  this House, 
in quality a Committee of  Public Safety, or shall we depute the 
power of  the Speaker… to carry on the war?”90 While Clay 
and Calhoun possessed powers far from those maintained by 
leaders of  the sanguinary French Revolution (1789-1799), such 
as Maximilien Robespierre and Louis Antoine de Saint-Just, 
the allusion exudes the unprecedented power that a legislative 
committee was exercising over the formation of  foreign policy 
and the conduct of  diplomacy.
As the war carried on, the jostling between the Madison 
Administration and Congress reflected the dismal war effort. In 
general, American forces were being whipped on the continent but 
enjoyed surprising success in naval engagements despite British 
focus still being directed to the ongoing conflict with Napoleon 
in Europe. A year and a half  into the conflict, the war had 
exhausted hawkish passions and inflicted its substantial damages 
upon both belligerents. By early 1814, there was considerable will 
on both sides to resolve the conflict; subsequently, initial peace 
talks commenced. As then-Majority Leader Robert C. Byrd (D-
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WV) identified in his narrative history of  the Senate in 1988, 
the constitutional requirement for the upper house to provide 
its “advice and consent” to treaties has resulted in interesting 
quandaries over the years regarding the active participation of  
members of  Congress in the physical conduct of  diplomatic 
negotiation. The first time this occurred though was in 1814, 
when Speaker Clay joined Senator James Bayard (F-DE) in a 
bipartisan five-member delegation to negotiate a peace with 
Great Britain in the Flemish city of  Ghent, Belgium. While Clay 
had resigned from the House in order to attend and Bayard had 
not been re-elected for another term in the Senate, their presence 
in the negotiation of  the treaty stirred some speculation about 
their political role in securing congressional support for the peace 
accord and the constitutional consistency with the separation of  
powers.91 While this would be the first noticeable instance of  
congressional participation in diplomatic negotiation, it would 
not be the final time the presence of  senators and representatives 
on diplomatic delegations would be questioned.
Congress had its two representatives at Ghent to ensure 
the war it had waged was terminated on the federal legislature’s 
terms. Congress need not have worried that the result would 
be unsatisfactory, for the Western Star himself  was to bring 
the British to task. As Clay stepped down from the Speaker’s 
chair amid the jubilatory well-wishes of  his doting colleagues, 
one observer enthusiastically wrote at the time, “The war in 
which he had been most active in hastening, and most energetic 
in prosecuting, he was now to close…”92 Needless to say, 
Clay’s presence on the diplomatic delegation would guarantee 
smooth adoption of  the agreement back in Congress, while also 
establishing credibility for the treaty among the war’s initiators 
and the public. 
However, with Napoleon on his heels by April 1814, 
the British were reinvigorated in their aggression in America. 
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They stalled the peace negotiations through the summer while 
their forces defeated the U.S. Army at the Battle of  Bladensburg 
in Maryland and then occupied Washington D.C., burning the 
Capitol and the White House to the ground. President Madison 
and Congress were forced to abandon their residences and flee 
for safe havens; Clay and the other peace commissioners could 
only watch helpless from Belgium as the devastation of  the 
summer of  1814 unfolded. Congress returned to the capital in 
September 1814 to find the Capitol a smoldering pile of  rocks 
and ashes; in the meantime, it met in the lobby of  Blodgett’s 
Hotel while the citizens of  Washington D.C. desperately built 
the congressmen a temporary brick capitol building so that the 
federal legislature would not move the nation’s capital back to 
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. Doubtless while sitting in the hotel 
lobby in post-mortem, members of  Congress would have 
reflected upon the lessons that the present war had impressed 
upon them. Thankfully for these legislators, Baltimore, Maryland 
was held in American control because of  the efforts at Fort 
McHenry, repelling the British Royal Navy in one of  the final 
major campaigns of  the year and likely ensuring the survival of  
the American Union and the arrival of  peace.93
With the failure to close the campaigns of  1814, British 
commissioners at Ghent now seriously began seeking a peace 
settlement with the Americans. Negotiations proceeded quickly 
and by December 24, 1814, the Treaty of  Ghent was signed 
by the two diplomatic delegations and ratified by His Majesty’s 
government three days later. The Treaty of  Ghent reached 
Washington D.C. in February 1815 and was ratified unanimously 
upon receipt by the Senate with little, if  any, debate.94 With blessed 
peace finally realized across the continent, there was a new sober 
recognition of  the hardships of  war: 2,260 American soldiers 
had been killed in combat and an additional 4,505 were wounded. 
In total, it is estimated that some 15,000 American soldiers lost 
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their lives as a result of  all causes related to the conflict.95 But in 
its wake, the United States emerged intact with independence 
firmly secured from the former imperial motherland. And with 
the simultaneous defeat of  the French at Waterloo (in present-
day Belgium), the Napoleonic Wars also drew to a close. 
For the first time since independence, internal American 
politics and foreign policy would no longer be measured in 
relation to the eternal struggle between Great Britain and France: 
the United States was now finally free at last to pursue its own 
destiny among the nations of  the world. American culture in 
the postwar flourished with new symbols of  national identity, 
including the poem “The Star-Spangled Banner,” and the zeitgeist 
reflected the optimism Americans had for their young republic’s 
future. The following Era of  Good Feelings (1816-1824), an age 
of  national political peace in which the Democratic-Republicans 
The United States Capitol was razed by the British expeditionary forces 
under Vice Admiral Sir Alexander Cockburn and Major General Robert 
Ross on their march into Washington City on the evening of August 24, 
1814. The nation’s capital was almost totally destroyed and Congress 
had to relocate to a temporary meeting hall until the United States 
Capitol could be rebuilt after the War of 1812.
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virtually wiped out their Federalist opponents after the latter’s 
ill-fated secession attempts in New England, would allow the 
nation to heal and to begin building a bold new role for itself  
in the world beyond simply a pawn in the game between two 
imperial powers.
In addition to the conclusion of  the War of  1812 and 
the emergence of  the young republic from the Anglo-French 
dichotomy, the Age of  Democratic Revolutions was slowly giving 
birth to a constellation of  independent states in the Western 
Hemisphere; the United States would gain several sister republics 
in an increasingly-populated American neighborhood. When the 
French occupation of  the Iberian Peninsula was defeated by the 
alliance of  Britain, Portugal, and Spain in 1813, the American 
colonies were restored to their imperial authorities for a few 
years before rebellion broke out again. But the earlier Latin 
The British delegates, led by Admiral Lord Gambier (holding the Treaty of 
Ghent, center left), shakes hands with American delegate and U.S. Minis-
ter to the United Kingdom John Quincy Adams (center), concluding the 
War of 1812. Adams stands in front of Secreaty of the Treasury Albert 
Gallatin. Speaker Henry Clay observes the scene from afar, sitting in the 
chair behind the standing Senator James Bayard (hand on hip).
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American juntas had introduced reformed government with 
democratic principles and localized sovereignty; Spain’s attempt 
to return the status quo of  central monarchical authority over 
these colonies in the wake of  Napoleon’s defeat in the Peninsular 
Wars, therefore, resulted in backlash and the resurgence of  the 
Latin American revolutions by 1815. Thus, the Americas would 
once again be reopened by the end of  the War of  1812 as a 
battleground for U.S. interests, which the young republic would 
consider pursuing more and more vigorously following its 
vindication in the “Second War for Independence.” In the next 
decade and a half, the earlier signs of  congressional statecraft in 
the Western Hemisphere, seen through legislation such as the 
Mitchill Resolution, would serve as important antecedents for 
further action and points of  contention for those seeking to 
remain faithful to a more reserved foreign policy.
But just as changed by the War of  1812 as the international 
circumstances surrounding it, the United States Congress would 
emerge from its first substantial instance of  foreign policy 
leadership as a renewed body vying for more agency in the 
accelerating statecraft of  the American Republic. By the end of  
Clay’s first two terms as Speaker in 1814, there was little reason 
to doubt that “Harry of  the West” would be remembered in 
the annals of  American history as “the most powerful man in 
the nation from 1811 to 1825.”96 In his mad dash to lead the 
nation into war and thus assert a sovereign American order in 
the Western Hemisphere, Clay had accrued substantial political 
powers into the previously impotent office of  Speaker of  the 
House. Contemporaneous to this centralization of  power, the 
House began establishing a viable standing committee system 
that would enable specialization, permanency, and independence 
in the legislative branch.
This first period of  congressional initiative in foreign 
policymaking led by the War Hawks and their precocious 
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chief  Henry Clay would precipitate the continued institutional 
maturation of  the House and the Senate’s power structures. With 
the War of  1812 as its harbinger, Congress would be transformed 
by these developments and the emergence of  a visionary 
generation of  lawmakers that would produce the first age of  
American statecraft empowered through legislative assertiveness. 
And this ascendant generation of  young lawmakers aspiring for 
the American Founding Fathers’ glory had their guide, their 
Western Star. The young Speaker of  the House was poised to 
lead Congress into an evolving age of  legislative preeminence 
in foreign affairs that would last through the nineteenth century.
Penn History Review     89 
The War That Congress Waged
1 David S. Heidler and Jeanne T. Heidler, Henry Clay: The Essential American 
(New York: Random House, 2011), 84-85.
2 Quentin Scott King, Henry Clay and the War of  1812 (Jefferson, NC: McFar-
land and Company, 2014), 78.
3 Joel Achenbach, The Grand Idea: George Washington’s Potomac and the Race to the 
West (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2004), 217.
4 Ibid., 217.
5 William C. Allen, History of  the United States Capitol: A Chronicle of  Design, 
Construction, and Politics (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 
2001), 8.
6 Heidler and Heidler, Henry Clay: The Essential American, 84-85.
7 Robert W. Tucker and David C. Hendrickson, Empire of  Liberty: The Statecraft 
of  Thomas Jefferson (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990).
8 Annals of  Congress, 11th Congress, 3rd session, 63-64.
9 Heidler and Heidler, Henry Clay: The Essential American, 84-86.
10 Robert C. Byrd, The Senate, 1789-1989, Vol. 1, edited by Mary Sharon Hall 
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1988), 55-56.
11 King, Henry Clay and the War of  1812, 94.
12 Heidler and Heidler, Henry Clay: The Essential American, 85.
13 Byrd, The Senate, 1789-1989, Vol. 1, 52.
14 Henry Clay, John Calhoun, and Daniel Webster were destined to become 
rivals, colleagues, and friends in the next decades and became collectively 
known as “the Great Triumvirate” of  Congress, the most prominent Ameri-
can statesmen in the first half  of  the nineteenth century in which the Con-
gress was the dominant weight in the U.S. Government. For more, see Heidler 
and Heidler’s Henry Clay: The Essential American (2011).
15 Charles W. March, Reminiscences of  Congress (New York: Baker and Scribner, 
1850), 34.
16 U.S. House Journal, 13th Congress, 1st session, 26 May 1813; U.S. House Of-
fice of  History and Preservation, and U.S. Senate Historical Office, “Congres-
sional Biographical Directory (CLERKWEB),” Biographical Directory of  the 
United States Congress, accessed September 18, 2015, http://bioguide.con-
gress.gov/biosearch/biosearch.asp.
17 Byrd, The Senate, 1789-1989, Vol. 1, 52.
18 U.S. House of  Representatives, Office of  the Historian, Representatives Ap-
portioned to Each State: 1st to 23rd Census, 1790–2010 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. 
House of  Representatives Office of  the Historian, 2007).
19 J. Mackay Hitsman, The Incredible War of  1812 (Toronto: University of  To-
ronto Press, 1965), 27.
20 Byrd, The Senate, 1789-1989, Vol. 1, 52.
21 King, Henry Clay and the War of  1812, 79.
Penn History Review     90 
The War That Congress Waged
22 Byrd, The Senate, 1789-1989, Vol. 1, 52.
23 Ibid., 53.
24 Jack R. Van Der Slik, “The Early Institutionalization of  Congress,” in The 
Congress of  the United States, 1789-1989: Its Origins and Early Development, by Joel 
H. Silbey (New York: Carlson Publishing, 1991), 265.
25 Jeff  Broadwater, James Madison: A Son of  Virginia & a Founder of  the Nation 
(Chapel Hill, NC: University of  North Carolina Press, 2012), 145.
26 Byrd, The Senate, 1789-1989, Vol. 1, 54.
27 Marshall Smelser, The Democratic Republic, 1801-1815 (New York: Harper & 
Row, 1968).
28 Kevin R.C. Gutzman, James Madison and the Making of  America (New York: 
St. Martin’s Press, 2012), 304.
29 Cecil. V. Crabb, Glenn J. Antizzo, and Leila E. Sarieddine, Congress and the 
Foreign Policy Process: Modes of  Legislative Behavior (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State 
University Press, 2000), 29.
30 Andrew Burstein and Nancy Isenberg, Madison and Jefferson (New York: Ran-
dom House, 2010), 494-497.
31 Ibid., 314.
32 U.S. House Journal, 12th Congress, 1st session, 4 November 1811.
33 Thomas W. Skladony, “The House Goes to Work: Select and Standing Com-
mittees in the U.S. House of  Representatives, 1789-1828,” in The United States 
Congress in a Transitional Era, 1800-1841: The Interplay of  Party, Faction and Section, 
edited by Joel H. Silbey, Vol. 1, (Brooklyn, NY: Carlson Publishing, 1991), 36.
34 King, Henry Clay and the War of  1812, 103.
35 Ibid., 103.
36 Gerald Gamm and Kenneth Shepsle, “Emergence of  Legislative Institu-
tions: Standing Committees in the House and Senate, 1810-1825,” in The 
United States Congress in a Transitional Era, 1800-1841: The Interplay of  Party, 
Faction and Section, edited by Joel H. Silbey, Vol. 1 (Brooklyn, NY: Carlson 
Publishing, 1991), 80; Gerald Gamm and Kenneth Shepsle, “Emergence of  
Legislative Institutions: Standing Committees in the House and Senate, 1810-
1825,” in The United States Congress in a Transitional Era, 1800-1841: The Interplay 
of  Party, Faction and Section, edited by Joel H. Silbey, Vol. 1 (Brooklyn, NY: 
Carlson Publishing, 1991), 80.
37 King, Henry Clay and the War of  1812, 79.
38 Clement Eaton, Henry Clay and the Art of  American Politics (Boston: Little, 
Brown and Company, 1957), 25.
39 Annals of  Congress, 12th Congress, 1st session, 576.
40 Ibid., 570.
41 Rep. (Rev.) Samuel Taggart to Rev. John Taylor, November 7, 1811, “Letters 
to Samuel Taggart,” Proceedings, American Antiquarian Society (Worcester, MA: 
Penn History Review     91 
The War That Congress Waged
American Antiquarian Society, 1924), New Series, v. 33, Pt. 2:361.
42 Charles W. March, Reminiscences of  Congress (New York: Baker and Scribner, 
1850), 42.
43 Robert C. Byrd, The Senate, 1789-1989l, Vol. 2, edited by Wendy Wolff  
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1988), 217.
44 Joseph Cooper, “Jeffersonian Attitudes Toward Executive Leadership and 
Committee Development in the House of  Representatives, 1789-1829,” 
in The United States Congress in a Transitional Era: 1800-1841: The Interplay of  
Party, Faction and Section, edited by Joel H. Silbey, Vol. 1 (Brooklyn, NY: Carlson 
Publishing, 1991), 59.
45 George Godwin, Jr., The Little Legislatures: Committees of  Congress (Amherst, 
MA: University of  Massachusetts Press, 1970), 7.
46 Steven S. Smith and Christopher J. Deering, Committees in Congress (Washing-
ton, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1984), 10.
47 Gamm and Shepsle, “Emergence of  Legislative Institutions,” 81.
48 Ibid., 77.
49 Ibid., 86-91.
50 Byrd, The Senate, 1789-1989, Vol. 1, 55.
51 Elaine K. Swift, “Reconstitutive Change in the U.S. Congress: The Early 
Senate, 1789-1841,” in The United States Congress in a Transitional Era, 1800-
1841: The Interplay of  Party, Faction and Section, edited by Joel H. Silbey, Vol. 1 
(Brooklyn, NY: Carlson Publishing, 1991), 106-107.
52 Bradford Perkins, Prologue to War: England and the United States, 1805-1812 
(Berkeley: University of  California Press, 1961), 267.
53 David S. Heidler and Jeanne T. Heidler, Encyclopedia of  the War of  1812 
(Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 1997), 389-393.
54 Robert C. Byrd, The Senate, 1789-1989, Vol. 1, edited by Mary Sharon Hall 
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1988), 54.
55 U.S. House Journal, 11th Congress, 2nd session, 1 May 1810.
56 Stephen W. Stathis, Landmark Legislation, 1774 - 2002: Major U.S. Acts and 
Treaties (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2003), 32-34.
57 U.S. House Journal, 12th Congress, 1st session, 5 November 1811.
58 Quentin Scott King, Henry Clay and the War of  1812 (Jefferson, NC: McFar-
land and Company, 2014), 98.
59 Annals of  Congress, 12th Congress, 1st session, 414-417.
60 Byrd, The Senate, 1789-1989, Vol. 1, 57.
61 Byrd, The Senate, 1789-1989, Vol. 1, 57; Stathis, Landmark Legislation, 34-37.
62 King, Henry Clay and the War of  1812, 104-111.
63 Henry Clay to James Monroe, March 16, 1812, in The Papers of  Henry Clay, 
edited by Mary W.M. Hargreaves and James F. Hopkins, Vol. 1 (Lexington: 
University of  Kentucky Press, 1959), 637.
Penn History Review     92 
The War That Congress Waged
64 King, Henry Clay and the War of  1812, 115.
65 Annals of  Congress, 12th Congress, 1st session, 1587-1598.
66 Ibid., 1587-1598.
67 King, Henry Clay and the War of  1812, 132-138.
68 U.S. Senate Journal, 12th Congress, 1st session, 1 June 1812.
69 Ibid., 1 June 1812.
70 Annals of  Congress, 12th Congress, 1st session, 1546-1554.
71 Ibid., 1633-1637.
72 Leland R. Johnson, “The Suspense Was Hell: The Senate Vote for War in 
1812,” in The United States Congress in a Transitional Era, 1800-1841: The Interplay 
of  Party, Faction and Section, edited by Joel H. Silbey, Vol. 1 (Brooklyn, NY: 
Carlson Publishing, 1991), 197-216.
73 Arthur Preston Whitaker, The United States and the Independence of  Latin Amer-
ica, 1800-1830, 2nd ed. (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1964), 61-80.
74 Dexter Perkins, A History of  the Monroe Doctrine, 3rd ed. (Boston: Little, 
Brown and Company, 1963), 21.
75 Whitaker, The United States and the Independence of  Latin America, 47-58.
76 Ibid., 47-58.
77 Ibid., 79-90.
78 David C. Hendrickson, Union, Nation, or Empire: The American Debate over In-
ternational Relations, 1789-1941 (Lawrence: University Press of  Kansas, 2009), 
78-80.
79 U.S. House Journal, 12th Congress, 1st session, 5 November 1811.
80 Annals of  Congress, 12th Congress, 1st session, 428.
81 Ibid., 428.
82 Ibid., 428.
83 Ibid., 428.
84 Whitaker, The United States and the Independence of  Latin America, 83.
85 Brian Loveman, No Higher Law: American Foreign Policy and the Western Hemi-
sphere since 1776 (Chapel Hill, NC: University of  North Carolina Press, 2010), 
22-27.
86 Perkins, A History of  the Monroe Doctrine, 3rd ed., 23.
87 Walter A. McDougall, Promised Land, Crusader State: The American Encounter 
with the World since 1776 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1997), 58.
88 Byrd, The Senate, 1789-1989, Vol. 1, 57.
89 William Ray Barlow, Congress During the War of  1812, Ph.D. dissertation, The 
Ohio State University, 1961 (Ann Arbor, MI: ProQuest Dissertations Publish-
ing, 1961), v-vii.
90 Ibid., 22-24.
91 Robert C. Byrd, The Senate, 1789-1989, Vol. 2, edited by Wendy Wolff  
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1988), 15.
Penn History Review     93 
The War That Congress Waged
92 King, Henry Clay and the War of  1812, 263.
93 Byrd, The Senate, 1789-1989, Vol. 1, 61-65.
94 U.S. Senate Executive Journal, 13th Congress, 3rd session, 16 February 1815.
95 Donald R. Hickey, Don’t Give Up the Ship! Myths of  The War of  1812 (Urbana: 
University of  Illinois Press, 2006).
96 Byrd, The Senate, 1789-1989, Vol. 1, 55.
Images:
Page 44: “Henry Clay,” painting, 1818, via Wikimedia Commons, https://up-
load.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/9/92/Henry_Clay.JPG (accessed 
May 4, 2016).
Page 55: “Henry Clay Senate3,” engraving, circa 1855, drawn by Peter F. 
Rothermel, engraved by Robert Whitechurch, via Wikimedia Commons, 
https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/c/ce/Henry_Clay_Sen-
ate3.jpg (accessed May 4, 2016).
Page 85: “US Capitol 1814c,” drawing, 1814, George Munger, via Wikime-
dia Commons, https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/9/9a/
US_Capitol_1814c.jpg (accessed May 4, 2016).
Page 86: “Signing of  Treaty of  Ghent (1812),” painting, 1814, Amédée For-
estier, via Wikimedia Commons, https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/
commons/7/73/Signing_of_Treaty_of_Ghent_%28128%29.jpg (accessed 
May 4, 2016).
